

CONCLUSION

When Lonergan writes about 'knowledge,' he means primarily immanently generated knowledge. Communicated knowledge from common fund is usually received in the form of a belief. Intellectually oriented people tend to exclude their beliefs when they make their own contribution to the common fund of knowledge. In this context, Lonergan distinguishes explanatory knowledge, which is different from and it is complementary to (unbiased) common sense knowledge. The two kinds of knowledge cannot conflict. In Swinburne's epistemology, not only that they cannot conflict, but a (explanatory and/or scientific) theory should not radically change the meanings of ordinary words. Similarly as it is in empirical sciences, new meanings can be given to ordinary words by amending semantic and syntactic rules.

Lonergan's affirmation of the timelessness of God is deduced from his explanatory concept of God as an unrestricted act of understanding. The existence of such an act is affirmed in his argument for the existence of God. For Swinburne, Lonergan's argument would not be acceptable at all for the same reason as the ontological arguments. Namely, they are not common sense arguments. They are mere philosophers' arguments, and they do not codify any of the reasons that ordinary people have for believing that there is a God. He would also refuse it for the same reason as he refuses all deductive arguments. Namely, (even though they may be valid) they start from premises which are far from generally accepted. Clearly,

Swinburne's refusal of these arguments is biased, since he discards them only because they do not seem significant to him. This does not mean that they are not valid, sound, or valuable.

Even if one accepts Lonergan's argument for the existence of God, it does not seem to necessarily follow that God has to be postulated as an absolutely timeless act. The argument requires that there is no unexplained fact in reality. Swinburne tries to explain that there is nothing unintelligible or unexplainable about God being in time. God freely and reasonably decides to create and sustain the universe (with free human beings) in a temporal existence, and thus become temporally related to the concrete creature. There is nothing in actuality, which he cannot know. He may not know some events, which are in future. He may not have absolute certainty about the future choices of free agents. This would be a consequence of his decision to create free beings, and thus it is explained by the reasons for his decision to create them.

Swinburne would refuse Lonergan's argument and his concept of God, because he is not able to see any meaning in the concept of a timeless personal creator. Lonergan defines this meaning through an unrestricted act of understanding, which is made meaningful in the analogy with human instantaneous grasp of the intelligibility of different aspects of reality. Swinburne does not seem to consider this particular instance of human experience.

Considering Swinburne's arguments for the existence of God as such, it does not necessarily follow that God has to be postulated as temporal. Swinburne's probabilistic model could be modified to support the existence of a timeless being, if this concept guarantees that the overall theory will have more explanatory power or, at least, it simplifies some aspects of theistic explanation. A defender of timelessness

could use Swinburne's inductive arguments, if he or she elaborates better the attributes of God or modifies Swinburne's criteria for comparing different overall theories.

One of the main reasons for affirming the timelessness in Lonergan was that he adopted Minkowski's (static) interpretation of space and time (which is clear from his affirmation of timeless formal intelligibility of temporal reality and relativity of all reference frames). It is logically impossible that a being could know entire universe and yet exist in this sort of time. However, this is not how a common sense people perceive time, even though Lonergan's explanation is somehow complementary to common sense. It is complementary in the sense that it explains 'confusion' of the concrete measurements of space and time in more distant places of the universe. The difficulty in Lonergan would arise if one used his concept of time in explaining the attributes of God. On Lonergan's definition of time, not only the unrestricted act is 'time-less,' but also Swinburne's God is 'time-less.' A change in knowledge and/or willingness of God, as explained by Swinburne, would not constitute time in Lonergan's sense. Therefore, from the intrinsic immateriality of God, it does not seem to follow that God must be postulated as absolutely timeless. It does follow, however, that God cannot be in Lonergan's time.

Furthermore, if one wants to use Lonergan's considerations on time in philosophical theology, we have to say that it does not seem to be true that a unique cosmic time is an illusion (as Lonergan says). There is evidence in modern cosmology against this statement. Therefore, it would not be logically contradictory to postulate the possibility of a unique timely conditioned understanding of all temporal reality.

Swinburne in his philosophical theology adopts a common sense meaning of time, and argues that based on modern cosmology (more specifically, on the principle of similar clocks), we have good reasons to postulate a unique cosmic time. This concept of time in modern cosmology would be complementary to common sense time in the sense that they have very similar characteristics (e.g. unique, continuous, and one-dimensional). On a common sense definition of time, even when there is no universe, God would exist in time in a minimal sense ('before' and 'after' the universe existed).

Overall, Lonergan's two main reasons for affirming divine timelessness (the perfection of divine understanding and its intrinsic immateriality) do not seem to necessarily imply such a conclusion. Furthermore, we found his theory as having less explanatory power than Swinburne's theory (because it does not explain how a timeless God could know and sustain the concrete temporal occurrences), and that Lonergan uses much more 'stretched' and complex analogies. Hence if Swinburne's criteria for comparing theistic and overall atheistic hypotheses are adopted as the evidence of truth, Swinburne's theory should be adopted as more probably true. The fact that Lonergan's arguments are less probably true on Swinburne's criteria is not a reason for their refusal (as Swinburne would do). Lonergan's theory may be true and valuable for some intellectually oriented people. In overall, however, a deeper elaboration of the relation between a timeless and temporal being and of different concepts of time is required. Or one has to radically revise Swinburne's criteria for judging which theory is (more probably) true.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alston, William P., 'Does God Have Beliefs?' *Religious Studies* 22 (1987), pp. 287-306.
- Antony, Louise, 'Making Room for the Mental,' *Philosophical Studies* 95 (1999), pp. 38-40.
- Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, transl. T. McDermott, O.P. (London: T.J. Press, 1964).
- Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
- Aristotle, *Physics*, transl. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Arndt, Stephen Wentworth, 'The Justification of Lonergan's Cognitional and Volitional Process,' *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 65 (1991), pp. 45-61.
- Balashov, 'Two Theories of the Universe,' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, vol. 29, no. 1 (1998), pp. 141-149.
- Bavister, Steve, *Digital Photography* (London: Collins & Brown Ltd., 2000).
- Bernstein, Jeremy - Fishbane, Paul M. – Gasiorowicz, Stephen, *Modern Physics*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000).
- Brann, Eva, *What, Then, Is Time?* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999)
- Budden, Tim, 'A Star in the Minkowskian Sky: Anisotropic Special Relativity,' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, vol. 28, no. 3 (1997), pp. 325-361.
- Butterfield, Jeremy, ed., *The Arguments of Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

- Byrne, Patrick H., 'Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor,' *Method*, 11 (1993), pp. 103-135.
- Byrne, Patrick H., 'God and the Statistical Universe,' *Zygon*, 16/4 (1981), pp. 345-363.
- Byrne, Patrick H., 'Lonergan on the Foundations of the Theories of Relativity,' *Creativity and Method*, ed. Mathew Lamb (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1981), pp. 477-494.
- Byrne, H. Patrick, 'Relativity and Indeterminism,' *Foundations of Physics* 11 (1981), pp. 913-932.
- Byrne, Patrick H., 'The Thomist Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic World-View,' *The Thomist*, 46/1 (1982).
- Callender, Craig – Edney, Ralph, *Introducing Time* (Cambridge: Totem Books, 2001).
- CWL, see Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*.
- Chenet, François, *Le Temps* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2000).
- Coburn, Robert C., 'Professor Malcom on God,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 41 (1963).
- Cousins, Ewert H., ed., *Process Theology* (New York: Newman Press, 1971).
- Ctein, 'Minolta DiIMAGE Scan – Multi-Pro Film Scanner,' *Photo Techniques* (November/ December 2002).
- Cushing, James T., 'What Measurement Problem?' *Perspectives on Quantum Reality*, ed. Rob Clifton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
- Davidson, D., 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (1963), pp. 685-700.
- Denbigh, Kenneth, 'Time's Arrows Today: Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time,' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*,

vol. 27B, no. 2 (1996), pp. 221-227.

Dummett, Michael, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Fitzgerald Paul, 'Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity,' *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985), pp. 260-269.

Flanagan, Joseph, *Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

Flew, Antony, *God and Philosophy* (London: 1966).

Flood, Raymond – Lockwood, Michael, eds., *The Nature of Time* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

Gale, R.M., *On the Nature and Existence of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Goldman, A.I., *A Theory of Human Action* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1970).

Hartshorne, Charles – Resse, William L., eds., *Philosophers speak of God* (New York: Humanity Books, 2000).

Hasker, William, *God, Time, and Knowledge* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

Hedgecoe, John, *New Introductory Photography Course* (London: Focal Press, 2000).

Hempel, C.G., *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1966).

Hengel, van den, John, see Van den Hengel, John.

Hepburn, R.W., 'Time Transcendence and Some Related Phenomena in the Arts,' *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. H.D. Lewis, Fourth Series (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976).

Hilbert, David, *The Foundation of Geometry*, transl. E.J. Townsend (La Salle, IL: Open

- Court, 1947).
- Hutchinson, Eliot Dole, 'Varieties of Insight in Humans,' *Psychiatry* 2 (1939), pp. 323-332; 'The Period of Frustration in Creative Endeavor,' *Psychiatry* 3 (1940), pp. 351-359; 'The Nature of Insight,' *Psychiatry* 4 (1941), 31-43. Reprint: P. Mullahy, ed., *A Study of Interpersonal Relations* (New York: Hermitage Press, 1949) Paperback: (New York: Grove Press, 1957).
- Kenny, Anthony, *The God of the Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
- Kernan Sean, *Lenswork*, No. 52, Apr-May 2004, pp. 31-32.
- Kim, Jaegwon, 'Making Sense of Emergence,' *Philosophical Studies* 95 (1999), pp. 10-13.
- Kretzmann, Norman, 'Omniscience and Immutability,' *Journal of Philosophy* 62 (1966), pp. 409-421.
- Lamb, Mathew L., ed., *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1981).
- Lenzen, Victor, F., *The Nature of Physical Theory* (London: J. Wiley and Sons, 1931).
- Le Poidevin, Robin, ed., *Questions of Time and Tense* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
- Le Poidevin, Robin – MacBeath, Murray, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Lewis, H.D., ed., *Contemporary British Philosophy, Fourth Series* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976).
- Liddy, *Transforming Light* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1993).
- Lloyd, Genevieve, *Being and Time* (London: Routledge, 1993)
- Lindsay, Robert B. – Margenau, Henry, *Foundations of Physics* (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Bow Press, 1981).
- Loizou, Andros, *The Reality of Time* (Brookfield, Vermont: Gower, 1986)

- Lonergan, Bernard, *De scientia atque voluntate Dei* (Toronto: Regis College, 1973).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 1, *Grace and Freedom*, eds. F.E. Crowe - R.M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Vol. 2, *Verbum*, eds. F.E. Crowe - R.M. Doran, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 3, *Insight*, eds. F.E. Crowe - R.M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 4, *Collection*, eds. F.E. Crowe - R.M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol. 5, *Understanding and Being*, eds. E.A. Morelli, - M.D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Vol. 6, *Philosophical and Theological Papers*, eds. F.E. Crowe - R.M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Vol. 18, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Insight* (San Francisco: 1978).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
- Lonergan, Bernard, *A Second Collection*, eds. W.F.J. Ryan - B.J. Tyrrell, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
- Lucas, J.R., *The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

- Marsh, J.L., *Process, Praxis and Transcendence* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).
- McCarroll, J., *The Development of Bernard Lonergan's Understanding of Divine Providence from Grace and Freedom to Insight*, PhD Dissertation (Queen's University of Belfast, 1988), pp. 346-351.
- Nenon, Thomas, 'Time Consciousness,' *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Supplement, ed. D.M. Borchert, London: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 569-571.
- Parmenides of Elea, *Fragments*, ed. David Gallop (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).
- Peebles, P.J.E., *Principles of Physical Cosmology* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 10.
- Pike, Nelson, *God and Timelessness* (New York: Schocken Books, 1970).
- Plantinga, Alvin, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Potter, Vincent, 'Objective Chance: Lonergan and Pierce on Scientific Generalization,' *Method* 12/1 (1994), pp. 91-107.
- Rohrlich, Fritz, 'Causality and the Arrow of Classical Time,' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, vol. 31, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1-13.
- Savit, S.F., ed., *Time's Arrows Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- Silberstein, Michael-McGeever, John, 'The Search for Ontological Emergence,' *The Philosophical Quarterly* 49 (1999), pp. 182-200.
- Silk, Joseph, *The Big Bang* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1989).
- Smith, Quentin, 'Time, Being, and Becoming,' *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Supplement, ed. D.M. Borchert (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 567-568.
- Sklar, Lawrence, 'Time, Direction of,' *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Supplement, ed. D.M. Borchert (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 568-569.

- Stump, Eleonore – Kretzmann, Norman, 'Eternity,' *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981), pp. 429-56.
- Stump, Eleonore – Kretzmann, Norman, 'Eternity, Awareness, and Action' *Faith and Philosophy* 9 (1992), pp 477-478.
- Swinburne, Richard, *The Christian God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
- Swinburne, Richard, *The Coherence of Theism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
- Swinburne, Richard, *The Coherence of Theism*, rev. edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
- Swinburne, Richard, 'Could God Become Man?' *The Philosophy in Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- Swinburne, Richard, *Epistemic Justification* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
- Swinburne, Richard, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
- Swinburne, Richard, *The Existence of God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
- Swinburne, Richard, *Faith and Reason* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
- Swinburne, Richard, 'God and Time,' *Reasoned Faith*, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).
- Swinburne, Richard, *An Introduction to Confirmation Theory* (London: Methuen, 1973).
- Swinburne, Richard, *Is there a God?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Swinburne, Richard, ed., *The Justification of Induction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
- Swinburne, Richard, 'The Modal Argument Is Not Circular,' *Faith and Philosophy* 15 (3) (1998), pp. 371-372.
- Swinburne, Richard, 'The Limits of Explanation,' *Philosophy* (1990), pp. 177-193.
- Swinburne, Richard, *Providence and the Problem of Evil* (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1998).

Swinburne, Richard, *Revelation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

Swinburne, Richard, *Responsibility and Atonement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

Swinburne, Richard, 'Some Major Strands of Theodicy,' *God and the Problem of Evil*, ed. William L. Rowe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

Swinburne, Richard, *Simplicity As Evidence of Truth* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997).

Swinburne, Richard, *Space and Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

Torretti, Roberto, 'Spacetime Models for the World,' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2000), pp. 171-186.

Ulf Jonsson, *Foundations for Knowing God: Bernard Lonergan's foundations for Knowledge of God and the Challenge from Antifoundationalism* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999).

Van den Hengel, John, 'God With/Out Being,' *Method* 12/2 (1994), pp. 251-279.

Vertin, Michael, 'Lonergan on Consciousness: Is There a Fifth Level?' *Method* 12/1 (1994), pp. 1-36.

Wolfson, Harry Austryn, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).